Presentation by H.E. Cho Tae-yul
Vice Foreign Minister of the Republic of Korea
at 2013 IFANS Global Conference in Celebration of KNDA 50th Anniversary
“Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative and Trustpolitik”

1. Introduction

As I understand President Park and Minister Yun discussed earlier today the vision and basic concept of Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (NAPCI) as well as Trustpolitik, the philosophical basis on which the initiative has developed, I would like to focus on “how” in my presentation.

I will discuss, first, how NAPCI differs from the initiatives of previous administrations for multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia; second, what are the basic approaches and principles in pursuing the initiative; third, what we have done so far and will do in the coming months and years to implement it; and last, what are the major challenges in pursuing the initiative.

2. How NAPCI differs from previous Northeast Asia initiatives?

Let me first explain to you how this particular initiative differs from the previous Northeast Asia initiatives.

All the previous administrations since President Roh Tae-woo’s in the late 1980s proposed some types of initiatives for Northeast Asian cooperation. And, as I understand it, some people think that NAPCI is not all that different from these initiatives.

However, the Park Geun-hye Government is not pursuing this initiative simply because previous administrations had made similar proposals. Rather, the initiative is being pursued from a very realistic and practical perspective, based on an objective understanding of the political reality in Northeast Asia, which is currently confronted with a crisis of trust or “Asia Paradox”, as I am sure was mentioned earlier by President Park and Minister Yun.

In recognition that building trust is the precondition for cooperation, this initiative differs from previous ones in two ways. First, it aims to promote a culture of regional cooperation grounded in trust, and second, it focuses on accumulating practices and habits of dialogue and cooperation starting with softer issues and areas.

Previous initiatives until the Kim Dae-Jung administration in the late 1990s focused on cooperation on traditional security issues. They employed a top-down approach based on political agreements between the leaders, rather than building trust through concrete cooperation projects. Therefore, they were never implemented in full.

The Roh Moo-hyun administration, on the other hand, did pursue an initiative for cooperation in Northeast Asia in areas that included non-traditional soft security issues. The initiative also aimed to pursue concrete projects of cooperation, such as establishing Northeast Asia security and economic communities. However, it proved difficult to pursue such projects, as they were too grand in scale.

NAPCI is pursued reflecting on the lessons learned from the experiences of previous administrations and with a focus on whether or not cooperation projects or dialogues are executable and their desired goals are achievable.

3. What are the basic approaches and principles in pursuing NAPCI?

Now I would like to share with you some of my thoughts on the basic approaches and principles we are going to uphold in pursuing the initiative.

First, the initiative takes a step-by-step and gradual approach. It is an evolving and process-oriented policy and is not aimed at hastily achieving tangible outcome. Therefore, the outcome can vary depending on the degree of interests of the countries in the region. We will not consider launching an organization until the conditions are ripe.

Second, the initiative will be pursued at a speed that all stakeholders can be at ease with. We will start cooperating with countries that are ready to participate, in areas where cooperation is relatively easy, and at the working level where the burden is less. We will expand the scope of cooperation only with the consent of the participating countries.

Third, the initiative aims to build on the existing cooperation mechanisms in the region. In Northeast Asia, there already exist a number of cooperation mechanisms in a wide range of areas. TCS (Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat) among China, Japan, and Korea is a good example. By connecting and complementing these existing mechanisms and revitalizing their activities within the larger framework of NAPCI, we can build an infrastructure of trust in the region. In areas where no cooperation mechanism exists, the initiative intends to create new processes of dialogue and cooperation.

Fourth, the initiative intends to be multi-layered and multi-dimensional. IT will be carried out at many levels, including tracks 1, 1.5 and 2 so that cooperation at each level will be mutually reinforcing and complementing. At the initial stage, we intend to take a bottom-up approach starting with softer and less controversial issues such as climate change, energy security, disaster relief, and nuclear safety. But, we do not preclude taking a top-down approach. If and when political commitment can be affirmed after building a certain level of trust, we will seek ways of cooperation that go beyond the given process.

Fifth, the initiative aims for an open dialogue and cooperation. The interested countries in the region are all welcome. North Korea, of course, will be encouraged to participate from the early stages of cooperation. The initiative also seeks to gradually link other stakeholders directly and indirectly. In the future, we will also consider inviting regional and international organizations as observers, so that we can share and get inspirations from their experiences and lessons learned in promoting regional cooperation. This is to leave open the possibility of linking regional cooperation in Northeast Asia with cooperation in other regions such as Southeast Asia and Europe.

Finally, we hope that all participating countries will feel a sense of ownership over the initiative. Rather than a particular country leading the process, the initiative aims for the active and voluntary participation of all participating countries. If any country already took a leading role or is interested in pursuing cooperation in a specific area, Korea is ready to play a facilitator’s role so that the said country can lead the process.

4. What we have done and will do to implement NAPCI?

Let me now move on to the next subject: what we have done and will do to implement NAPCI.

Since its inauguration in February, the Korean government has been making efforts to win international support for the initiative by actively engaging in high-level diplomacy, both bilateral and multilateral, including in particular summit meetings.

President

It was President Park who has been at the forefront in all these efforts which started even before she assumed office. In 2011, President Park presented her vision of NAPCI and its underlying philosophy, Trustpolitik, in a contribution to Foreign Affairs titled “A New Kind of Korea.”

Since taking office, she has elaborated on her vision of NAPCI in many policy speeches including, among others, at the joint session of the U.S. Congress and Tsinghua University in Beijing which were both very well received by the audience. All the leaders with whom she had summit meetings, including Presidents Obama and Xi Jinping, also showed respect and support for the initiative including through joint statements.

President Park was also able to get recognition for the initiative in the multilateral fora, such as G20, ASEAN+1 and 3, EAS, and APEC. In particular, she was able to get explicit support for the initiative in the Chairman’s statements of ASEAN+3, EAS and the Korea-ASEAN summit.

Cooperation with NATO is also worthy to note. After meeting with President Park in Seoul, NATO Secretary General Rasmussen took an initiative to organize an international conference to be jointly hosted by Korean and Swedish think tanks sometime next year to shed light on the implications of the European multilateral security cooperation for pursuing NAPCI.

Foreign Minister

Foreign Minister Yun has also done his due part in garnering international support for the initiative. He has been able to secure supports for NAPCI from all his counterparts he has met so far in both bilateral and multilateral settings.

Minister Yun has also been active in selling the initiative to the public at home and abroad by making a number of policy speeches such as at the Korea Society in New York in October as well as by writing articles such as one to Global Asia on the philosophy of Trustpolitik as the foundation of the initiative.

Vice Foreign Minister

I too have added my own contribution to these efforts. In particular, I discussed this initiative with OSCE Secretary-General Zannier three times, first in Ulaanbaata, second in Vienna, and third in Seoul recently. Secretary-General Zannier found the initiative quite interesting and promised to assist us in areas where the OSCE can make a contribution. Since then, working-level contact has been maintained between OSCE Secretariat and the Korean government to explore the avenues of cooperation on the initiative. The Secretary-General is currently on his visit to Seoul and presented his views on NAPCI at the Seoul Defense Dialogue held earlier this week.

I also played a role in Korea’s taking initiatives for a series of informal meetings among five countries in Northeast Asia on several soft issues within the framework of NAPCI. In early July, on the occasion of the IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security in Vienna, I hosted a breakfast meeting with the representatives of the four Northeast Asian countries and sounded out their reactions on cooperation on nuclear safety issues in Northeast Asia, an issue I believe was very much relevant especially in the aftermath of Fukushima accident in Japan. Since then, similar meetings have been held under my initiative on other soft issues such as energy security, cyberspace, and environment, respectively taking advantage of the World Energy Congress in Daegu and the Seoul Conference on Cyberspace both held in October as well as Northeast Asian Subregional Program for Environmental Cooperation (NEASPEC) held in Ulaanbaatar in early November.

We will work on the follow-up actions to these informal meetings based on the feedbacks from the participating countries and continue to explore the possibility of launching informal dialogues on these and other soft issues, wherever available and appropriate. As part of this effort, next year, we plan to hold a 1.5 track Seoul Forum so that the countries in the region can raise ideas on any issues that need cooperation across all areas.

5. What are the major challenges in Pursuing NAPCI?

This leads to the final subject of my presentation: major challenges in pursuing NAPCI.

In the aforementioned informal meetings I hosted on soft issues, a common question raised by participating countries was, “What is added value of this initiative?” They were not yet convinced of the need to create an additional process or mechanism, given the fact that regional and international mechanisms of cooperation already exist in many areas and are readily available for the use in regional context as well.

It is true that many cooperative mechanisms or projects are already underway in Northeast Asia, and today they are still evolving. But they are short of security perspectives. Virtually all the existing mechanisms in Northeast Asia are focused on technical and functional cooperation without putting it in a broader perspective of regional peace and security. NAPCI is aimed at adding a security dimension to the regional cooperation mechanisms by linking the existing mechanisms within the larger framework of the initiative and, if necessary and available, by creating new processes of dialogue and cooperation on selected soft security areas.

Another question commonly raised by participating countries was, “What to do with North Korea?” More specifically, the question was, “Is it not ‘6-1 structure’ that excludes North Korea?”

Without a doubt, we have no intention of excluding North Korea. Rather, we will continue to engage North Korea from the early stages of cooperation on any issues. If it takes more time for North Korea to consider joining the initiative, we will start it in a low-keyed manner so as not to irritate Pyongyang. Under any circumstances, we will leave the door open for North Korea’s participation at the time of its own choice.

Some people also question whether this initiative is feasible, given that the relations between China and Japan, and between Korea and Japan are strained. The current state of bilateral and trilateral relations among the countries in Northeast Asia may hinder the process of cooperation. But trilateral cooperation has evolved very rapidly in a wide range of areas over the past decades, regardless of political ups and downs. Collective efforts to build trust are all the more necessary especially when political relations are strained. In this regard, I would like to quote OSCE Secretary-General Zannier’s remarks at the Seoul Defense Dialogue the day before yesterday, “OSCE made a substantial contribution to building peace in a deeply polarized world in which an atmosphere of hostility and mistrust prevailed.”

6. Conclusion

This is a brief sketch of how we are going to work with the countries interested in pursuing NAPCI.

We know that a number of challenges lie ahead in our efforts and that some people are even raising skepticism as to whether this initiative is feasible.

However, such skepticism cannot be the reason why we should give up our efforts to accumulate practices and habits of dialogue and cooperation in this region facing a crisis of trust.

Certainly, Korea cannot do it alone. Various stakeholders in and out of the region should participate voluntarily and actively in the efforts.

Keeping in mind all the potential challenges, we will continue to work together with the governments of the interested countries, academia, corporations and civil society to promote a culture of cooperation and thereby overcome the so-called “Asia Paradox” in this region.

I would like conclude my presentation by quoting once again OSCE Secretary General Zannier’s remarks, “Building trust should be seen as both a process and an end goal. It takes time and patience, and often there are setbacks along the way.”