Special Opening Remarks
by H.E. Lim Sungnam
Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs

Missile Technology Control Regime Plenary
Busan, October 19, 2016

Ambassador De Klerk,
Distinguished delegates,

Good afternoon and a warm welcome to Busan.

It is a great honor to join you this afternoon. This Plenary is particularly meaningful in several ways. Let me tell you why.

To begin with, today we are welcoming a new Partner.

We have the honor of welcoming India in Busan after we welcomed Bulgaria in Seoul 12 years ago. India’s accession shows that the MTCR is a constantly developing regime.

I would like to send my warmest welcome to India, and look forward to working with India as a constructive and essential Partner of the MTCR.

In addition, the MTCR will celebrate its 30th Anniversary next year.

During the past three decades, the number of the MTCR Partners has grown from seven to thirty-five; its focus has expanded to include missiles for the delivery of chemical and biological weapons as well as nuclear weapons; and in 2002, it gave birth to the HCOC,
the only multilateral transparency and confidence-building instrument concerned with the spread of ballistic missiles.

There is no doubt that the day-to-day efforts of Partners have enormously contributed to countering the global missile proliferation.

But what makes this Plenary even more special is the fact that it takes place at the most appropriate venue in a most timely manner.

Today, North Korea’s ballistic missile program is undoubtedly the biggest challenge the MTCR faces.

While MTCR Partners have been striving to prevent the proliferation of missile technology, North Korea, as both a procurer and proliferator, flouted the international community by disregarding all norms and warnings.

This year alone, Pyongyang fired 23 rounds of different ballistic missiles. As you may know, the city of Busan is already within the range of Scud missiles.

And North Korea’s other missiles, such as Nodong, Musudan, and ICBM, can now target the capitals of each and every Partner gathered here.

This is why we must address this issue squarely bearing in mind the gravity and urgency of the matter.

Earlier this year, in response to Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test and ballistic missile launch, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2270, which is one of the strongest and most comprehensive sanctions resolutions ever adopted against any WMD program.

Notwithstanding UNSCR 2270, however, North Korea has repeatedly shown its intention to continue the development of its nuclear and missile capabilities through multiple provocations, culminating in its fifth nuclear test on September 9th.

In terms of magnitude, the September 9th nuclear test is the largest of the five that North Korea has conducted over the past decade.

This indicates that North Korea is advancing its nuclear capabilities at an alarming pace.

Following its latest test, Pyongyang claimed that it can now produce, I quote,“a variety of smaller, lighter, and diversified nuclear warheads of higher strike power at will,”unquote.

Kim Jong-un, in pursuit of advanced delivery means, ordered 23 ballistic missile launches in just 8 months since February.

This number far exceeds the total of 16 ballistic missiles launched during the entire 18-year regime of Kim Jong-il, his late father.

This not only illustrates the recklessness of the North Korean regime but also shows that North Korea is nearing a point where it can mount a nuclear warhead on a missile and hold the world hostage.

Indeed, Kim Jong-un has officially stated that he is ready to use nuclear weapons for pre-emptive strike.

Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile programs are a clear and present threat to international peace and security.

Friends and Colleagues,

North Korea now stands alone and isolated against a determined international community.

More than 100 countries have publicly condemned Pyongyang’s fifth nuclear test.

And now, it is imperative for the international community to faithfully implement resolution 2270.

As UN sanctions resolutions on North Korea have incorporated the MTCR Annex in its entirety since 2006, we can say that the MTCR constitutes an integral part of these resolutions.

Against this backdrop, I would like to share my ideas on the role of the MTCR, as a stronghold against the advancement of North Korea’s missile program.

First, the MTCR must step up its efforts to close the loopholes in the field of export control, which is the very mandate of the regime.

The pace of the technical advancement of North Korea’s missile program, most notably Musudan and the SLBM program, is truly alarming.

Such a phenomenon indicates a possible inflow of sensitive materials into North Korea and help from third countries.

To close these loopholes, we need to block North Korea’s procurement of below-threshold items.

In this regard, my Government announced a watch-list of 41 missile-related items last June, and shared this watch-list with Partners this week.

I hope that my Government’s watch-list can contribute to the international efforts to implement catch-all controls.

Secondly, the international community needs to take a holistic approach in dealing with North Korea’s procurement network.

The tighter international sanctions get, the more deliberate Pyongyang’s procurement tactics become.

Operating hand in hand with nebulous networks of suppliers, brokers and financiers, North Korea is even using diplomats and diplomatic pouches to procure sensitive materials in violation of the Vienna Conventions.

To address this issue, it is imperative that MTCR Partners actively exchange information and exercise extra vigilance on North Korea’s various procurement activities including through third countries.

By cooperating with other export control regimes and international bodies, especially the UNSC 1540 Committee and the HCOC, we can weave an intricate and multi-dimensional non-proliferation net to halt North Korea’s procurement activities.

Third, the MTCR needs to send a clear and strong message against North Korea’s missile activities at this critical juncture.

The public statement of the MTCR is not a political rhetoric. Rather, it is a useful and effective tool the Regime has in curbing the proliferation of missiles, which is our core mandate.

We have the responsibility to make North Korea realize that if it continues to challenge the non-proliferation regime, it will only end up worsening its isolation against a determined international community.

If we fail to send the right message at the end of this Plenary, I am afraid that we might give the wrong signal that the international community condones the wrongdoings of North Korea, which I strongly believe is unacceptable to every Partner here.

Friends and Colleagues,

The incoming Chair, Mr. HAM Sang-wook, will focus on facilitating discussions and finding solutions for the various challenges the regime faces today during his tenure of 2016-2017.

An example of what we Partners need to focus on is the issue of intangible technology transfer (ITT). Unlike 30 years ago, ITT is now a present threat.

Electronic communication is available anytime, anywhere, and e-commerce is growing exponentially; 3D printers have become just one of the more expensive toys which can be purchased in shopping malls in your neighborhood; thanks to globalization, people with technical expertise freely interact across the borders.

It will require ceaseless efforts for the MTCR to remain as relevant in the coming years as it is now.

In a similar vein, the MTCR needs to adapt to the new issues emerging from new actors in the field of export control.

In addition to countries and companies which supply and demand sensitive items, new actors such as transit and trans-shipment hubs, freight-forwarders, and the academia joined the scene.

Any one of them could be the weakest link in the global export controls network. The MTCR needs to expand its outreach activities to those various actors to increase their awareness.

Before closing, I would like to say that my Government is privileged this year to chair both the MTCR and the NSG concurrently, which is unprecedented in the history of export control regimes.

I view this double chairmanship as a token of trust from the international community for Korea’s non-proliferation commitment, and thus feel a great sense of responsibility.

However, collective efforts of all Partners will be essential in fulfilling this responsibility. We are the ones who write and guard the MTCR Guidelines and control lists, which are recognized as the international standard in this field.

I believe the price attached to our privileged membership is our joint responsibility to lead the global efforts to address the issue of missile proliferation, and guard the international non-proliferation regime.

I would like to close by assuring all of you that, as the chair country, the Republic of Korea will work closely with each and every one of you, and provide every support for a productive and successful Meeting.

Thank you very much. /END/